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SOCIALISM
BY P A U L M. SWEEZY

Mr. Chairman and Ladies and Gentlemen: I t is not my habit
to read prepared lectures, and I would prefer not to do it tonight.
In view of the extraordinary publicity which has surrounded this event,
however, I could not refuse the request of the press and wire services
for an advance text. And in view of the no less extraordinary interest
which certain official quarters have in the past shown in whatever
I happen to say at the University of New Hampshire, I think it may
be wisest to stick to the text so that at any rate there need be no
disagreement about what I am saying tonight.
First, let me say that I am very happy to be here at the University of New Hampshire again. For several years up to and including 1954, it was my privilege and pleasure to come here every
spring to lecture in the humanities course and to participate in less
formal student and faculty discussions. Due to circumstances over
which neither I nor anyone here at the University had any control,
these visits were interrupted-to my loss and regret. I hope tonight's
meeting marks the renewal of an association which I have always
found both enjoyable and fruitful.
But there is another reason why I am glad to be here tonight.
Through no virtue (or fault) of mine, my appearance on the campus
at this time has become a clear test of the quality of academic
freedom that exists at the University of New Hampshire. Academic
freedom, let me remind you, is not, at bottom, a matter of my freedom
to speak my mind. That freedom, I am glad to say, I still have;
and nothing has yet prevented me from making use of it. Academic
freedom is fundamentally the freedom of the academic community
to employ or otherwise bring before it anyone whose ideas and opinions
it may think of interest or importance. It is a part, and a very important part, of the freedom of the sovereign people to educate itself
for the responsibility of governing, and as such it is protected by the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The
This is a slightly revised text of a speech delivered at the University
of New Hampshire on M a y 22, 1956.

MONTHLY REVIEW

of man, of society, and of history. It bears th
a b a n who was born in 1818
the latter half of his life in London. Marx
learning and enormously powerfuI intellect, one of the greatest!
thinkers not only of the nineteenth century but of all recorded histoq.;
Marx combined in his system of ideas the realistic philoso&;!
of the English and French Enlightenment, the comprehensive as&/:
dynamic point of view of the Gennan idealists and particularly,.of;,
Hegel, and the hardheaded and* of the capitalist economy which(
we owe to the great British classical economists. The result was a:
brilliant new synthesis which is both highly original and at
time stands squarely in the mainstream of modem intellec
velopment from the Renaissance onward. Here, in desperate
are what I understand to be the central elements of the Mami
of society and history:
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The universe is real knd existed for eons before there was human
life, or for that matter life of any kind, on our planet. Life here
on the earth is a natural by-pduct of the earth's cooling, and
humanity is the result of a long process $ofev0Eution. In the earliest
stages of society, human labor was still so unproductive that it
yielded no surplus aver and above the requiremenb of life and rp
production. As long as this was true, men lived in a state of primitive
cornmuni-perating,
sharing, fighting, but not yet exploiting
each other.
Later, techniques improved so much that a man could produce
a surpIus over and above what he needed for himself, and from this
dates the beginning of economic exploitation and social classes. When
one tribe fought and defeated another, it was now worthwhile to take
captive the vanquished and force them to work for the victors. Some
men became rulers living off the surplus produced by others; while
the actual producers lost their independence and spent their lives
toiling for their mastus. It was in this way that exploitation of man
by man and the divhidn of society into classes originated.
But the form of enplotation has not r e m ~ dunchangedindeed, nothing remains unchanged, everything is in a constant state
of flux. The exploiten seek to expand the surplus at their &pod,
and with this end in view they invent and introduce new and better
techniques of production; the exploited seek to improve their condition and therefore carry on a never-ending struggle to enlarge their
share of the product. As a result the forms of exploitation change,
and with them the whole structure of society. At first it was slavery,
in which the laborer is the property of his master. Next came serfdom,
in which the laborer has attained a certain degree of freedom but
is still tied to the soil. And finally there is wage labor, in which the
laborer is legally entirely free but must work for the profit of others
because he lacks means of production of his own.
A society based on private ownership of the means of production
and wage labor is called capitalism. I t came into the world fist in
England and certain parts of Western Europe, not all at once but
gradually and painfully between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. It brought with it social and political upheavals, new ways
of thinking, and a deep awareness of the vast creative potentials
of human labor and industry. Historically speaking, capitalism was
a long leap forward. In the words of the Communist Manifesto: "It
has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It
has'accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman
aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that
put in the shade all former migrations and crusades."
But capitalism contains within itself what Marx called contra-
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dictions which prevent it from f d y realizing the potentials which
it was the first to uncover. The capitalist class, comprising those who
own the instruments of production and set them in motion, is and
must be concerned with making profits, not with the general welfare.
Capitalists subordinate other aims to the maximbation of profit. In
pursuit of this objective, they pay workers as little as they can get
away with and steadily introduce labor-saving machinery. The conseis to hold dawn the c o m d g power of the worktime, the capitalists restrict their own consumpaccumulating more and more capitd. But acore h d more capita means adding to society's produc. We, the&ore3 have the paradox that capitalism steps
as far as cowump~& is concerned and on the accelerator
fat as production is concerned. This is its-basiccontradiction, and
cannot be eliminated except through changing the system from one
f production for pmfit to one of productim for use.
On the basis of this analpie, Marx believed that it was to the
interest of the workers to organize themselves politically in order
eventually to gain power and replace capitalism by a system based
upon common ownership of the means of production and economic
planning, a system to which he and his followers came in time to
give the name of socialism.. Moreover, Manr had no doubt that the
workers would in fact follow this course, and that their growing numbimportance, and discipline under capitalism would sooner or
later ensure their victory. As to how the transition would be effected,
Marx at first thought that it would have to be everywhere by means
af a violent revolution. But as political democracy spread, especially
in the English-speaking countries, he modified this view and in the
last debdes of his life believed that a peaceful and legal transition
was quite possible in some countries and under some conditions. "We
know,'' he said in a speech at Amsterdam in 1872, "that special regard must be paid to the institutions, customs, and traditions of
various lands; and we do not deny that there are certain countries,
such as the United States and England, in which the workers may
hope to achieve their ends by peaceful means."
What b Socialism?
So much then for Marxism. Naturally, my account is oversimplified and very incomplete, but I hope it may serve to give you
some idea of the scope and quality of Marx's thought--so differeat
from the impressions which demagogic opponents have always sought
to convey. Let us now ask: What is socialism?
Socialism, according to Marx, is the form of society which wiH
succeed capitalism, just as capitalism is the form of society whichsucceeded feudalism.
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The fundamental change would consist in the abolition of private ownership of the means of production. Please note that neither
Marx nor (so far as I know) any other modern socialist of irnportance ever advocated or expected that private ownership of consumer
goods would or should be abolished. On the contrary, he favored
the multiplication of consumer goods in the hands of the lowerincome groups, hence a great extension of private ownership in this
sphere.
As to the form of ownership of the means of production which
would characterize socialism, Marxists have never been dogmatic.
Ownership must be by public bodies, but that does not necessarily
mean only the central government: local governments, special public
authorities of one sort or another, and cooperatives can also own
means of production under socialism. And there can even be a certain
amount of private ownership, provided it is confined to industries
in which production takes place on a small scale.
A corollary of public ownership of the means of production is
economic planning. The capitalist economy is governed by the market, that is to say, by private producers responding to price movements with a view to maximizing their own profits. I t is through
this mechanism that supply and demand are adjusted to each other
and productive resources are allocated to various industries and
branches of production. But public bodies have no compelling reason
to maximize their profits (though, admittedly, under certain circumstances they may be directed to make as much profit as they can).
In general, therefore, they must have some other principle to guide
' their economic conduct, and this can only be the following of a plan
which coordinates the activities of all the public bodies.
Now socialists claim that it is precisely the freedom from the
necessity to make profits and the coordination of all economic activities by a general plan which allows socialism to overcome the contradictions of capitalism and to develop its resources and technology
for the greatest good of the people as a whole. Under such a system,
crises and unemployment could only result from bad planning; and
while bad planning is certainly not impossible, especially in the early
stages of socialist society, there is no reason why planners should not
learn to correct their mistakes and to reduce the resulting maladjustments and disproportions to smaller and smaller dimensions.
What about the non-economic aspects of socialism? Here Marx
had a well-developed theory. He expected socialism to come first in
the more advanced industrialized countries and to build on the political foundations which they had already achieved. Since in such countries the workers were in a majority, he believed that the taking of
political power by the working class would mean full democracy
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and liberty for most of the people, though he also expected that
there would be a period of greater or lesser duration when the rights
and freedoms of the former exploiters would be subject to certain
restrictions. As to the longer-run future, he reasoned that the full
development of society's economic potential under socialism would
gradually raise the well-being and education of everyone so that
eventually all classes and class distinctions would be done away
with. When that happened-but not before-the state as a repressive
apparatus for dealing with class and other forms of social conflict
would '%ither away." The final goal of Marx and his followers
can therefore be said to be the same as that of the philosophical
anarchists. I t would be a state of society in which, to quote Marx's
words, "the free development of each is the condition for the free
development of all" and in which distribution takes place according
. to the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according
to his need."
Others before Marx had had a similar vision of a good society
to cornea society of abundance and brotherhood in place of the
society of scarcity and alienation which the human race had always
been condemned to live in. What particularly distinguished Marx
from his predecessors is that he purported to prove that this society
of the future, which he called socialism, is not only a dream and
a hope but is in fact the next stage of historical evolution. It would
not come automatically, to be sure-not as the result of the blind
decrees of fate. I t would come rather as the result of the conscious,
organized activity of working people, the vast majority of mankind.
Given this perspective, the task of the humanitarian could only be
to devote his energies to educating and organizing the working class
to fulfil its historic mission. That, in a word, is what Marxists have
been trying to do for nearly a hundred years now.
Was Man Right?
Marx's prophetic forecast of the end of capitalism and the opening of a new era in human history was given to the world in the
Communist Manifesto in 1848. More than a century has passed since.
Do the facts of this intervening period permit us to say whether
Marx was right or wrong?
In the broadest sense, I do not see how it can be denied that
Marx has been brilliantly vindicated. A mighty socialist movement
based on the working class grew up during his lifetime. The crises
of capitalism, far from abating, grew in intensity and violence, culminating in the holocausts of two world wars. Beginning with the
Russian Revolution of 1917, more and more of the earth's population
has withdrawn from the orbit of capitalism and has undertaken to
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reconstruct its economy and society on the basis of public ownership
and planning. Today, something like a third of the human race has
definitively abandoned private enterprise and, under Communist leadership, is building up a network of planned economies.
But it is not only in Communist-led countries that this is happening, though elsewhere the pace is slower. Since World War 11,
Great Britain has moved a considerable distance along the road to
a socialized economy, and one of the two big political parties is a
socialist party. Even more recently, India, next to Communist China
the most populous country in the world, has adopted a Five Year
Plan which the sober London Times calls "India's Socialist Plan."
The fact is that over most of the world's surface the trend is
now visibly away from private enterprise and toward public ownership of the means of production, away from market-dominated economies and toward economic planning. Only in the United States and
a few countries closely allied to the United States does the trend seem
to be in the other direction. Here, it is true, the socialist movement
is at a low ebb, and private enterprise is very much in the saddle.
Should we perhaps conclude that Marx was right for the rest
of the world but wrong for the United States? Are we the great
exception? Or are we merely lagging somewhat behind in a movement which eventually will be as universal as Marx predicted it
would?
These are crucial questions, especially for us Americans. In
w h t time remains to me, I shall attempt to indicate some possible
answers.
There is one respect, and it is an important one, in whieh Marx
was certainly wrong. As I noted earlier, he expected socialism to come
first in the most advanced industrial countries. I t did not. For
reasons having to do with the late 19th- and early 20th-century development of relations between the advanced countries and the
colonial and semi-colonial backward countries,the revolutionary movement grew more rapidly and had more opportunities in the backward than in the advanced regions. When the capitalist system was
wracked by the destruction and disasters of the two world wars, it
broke at its weakest points not at its strongest, Socialism came first to
the Tsarist Empire, and spread from there to Eastern Europe and

China.
This has, of course, meant that the early stages of the development of socialism have been very different from what Manr foresaw.
The new order could not build directly on the achievements of
the old. It had no developed industrial base, no educated and trained
labor force, no political democracy. It had to start from scratch and
work under conditions of utmost difficulty.
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Many people, including Marxists, expected socialism to proceed
at once, or at any rate within a short time, to achieve its great goals:
an economy of abundance, increasing democracy and freedom for
the workers, a richer life for all. It could have happened that way
if Britain, Germany, and the United States had been the first great
socialist countries. But it could not possibly happen that way in backward Russia standing alone for a whole generation. The industrial
base had to be built, and that meant belt-tightening. The Russians
had no traditions of democracy and civil liberty, and under the difficult conditions of the '20s and '30s it was natural that a new police
state should arise on the foundations of the old Tsarist police state.
Moreover, like all police states this one committed excesses and
horrors which had little if anything to do with the central tasks of
construction the regime had set itself.
Under these circumstances, socialism in practice had little attraction for the people
of the advanced countries. The standard of
living of those living under it remained abysmally low, and political
conduct, both among leaders and between leaders and people, often
seemed closer to oriental despotism than to enlightened socialism. It
was widely assumed in the West either that the Soviet Union was not
socialist at all, or that socialism had been tried and failed.
In the underdeveloped countries, however, the USSR made a
very different impression. They saw rapid economic advance, a vast
process of popular education, some improvement in living standardsand never having experienced democracy themselves, they hardly noticed its absence in Russia. Communism was imposed on Eastern
Europe by the Red Army chasing Hitler back to Berlin, but in China
it was the product of a great popular revolution. And it is now
expanding its influence throughout the underdeveloped regions of
the world.
-

The Competition of the Systems
The two systems of capitalism and socialism exist side by side
in the world today. They are competing for the support and emulation
of the backward and uncommitted countries. They are also competing
in terms of absolute performance. How will this contest turn out?
Will those now in the capitalist camp remain there? Or will they
tend to join the socialist camp as time goes on? And finally, what
about the United States, the leader of the capitalist camp?
These are questions which every serious person in the world
is asking today. I predict that they will be increasingly the center
of attention in the years and decades ahead.
The answers, I think, will depend very largely on the relative
success of the two systems in the following fields: production and
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income, education, and liberty. I believe that socialism will win out
in this great world-shaking contest, and I am going to conclude my
talk by trying to give you some of the reasons why I hold this view.
I should add perhaps that I don't expect you to agree with me at
this stage of the game. The decisive forces and trends are still operating for the most part below the surface, and it will be some time yet
before they can be seen and evaluated by all. But I hope that I may
succeed in making you think seriously about these matters. It is, I
believe, important that Americans should be put on notice that things
are happening in the world, and will increasingly happen, which contradict their established thought patterns and expectations. You may
not believe me yet, but at any rate if you pay serious attention to
what I say you should not be surprised when things turn out differently from the way you have been taught to expect.
Let us first look at the relative performance of the two systems
in the economic field proper. It will be generally agreed, I suppose,
that United States capitalism has been doing about as well as can
be expected in the last decade. Let us assume for the sake of the
argument that it continues to do as well (though I myself think
a good case can be made out for the view that this is too favorable
an assumption for capitalism). Let us also assume that the USSR
continues to grow at about its present rate, though I believe this is
likely to be an under- rather than an over-estimate. On these assump
tions, what will be the outcome of the economic competition between
the systems?
The answer is clear and unambiguous. Here is the way the Oxford economist, Peter Wiles, put the matter in a broadcast over the
BBC last fall (I am quoting from the October 20th, 1955, issue of
The Listener, weekly publication of the BBC) :
Perhaps the most important fact in all modern economics
is that the rate of growth of productivity is higher in the Soviet
Union than in any important free country at the period of its
maximum development, let alone now. That is, whether we take
roughly comparable circumstances or the present circumstances,
the Soviet superiority remains. The best performance by a large
non-Communist economy for a long period together appears to
be that of Japan: between 1912 and 1937 she grew by about
3 percent per annum. The Soviet economy grew by about 5%
percent per annurn before the war and by about 7% percent since
1948. For mining and manufacturing alone . . . the figures are:
Japan 7 percent, USSR 12 percent.
We see that the overwhelming Communist superiority in
industry alone leads to a great overall superiority (in the whole
national income). The effect of compound interest is very great
over a few decades. Thus, growing 3 percent per annum faster
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than the United States, the USSR could catch up from a starting point of half the United States national income per head in

.

#

''

23 years.

:j

e

These facts are not widely known in the United States, I am i;
sorry to say, but there is no doubt about thdr authenticity. Thuq ,#!
for example, the New York Times of a few days ago (May 18) 'i
quotes Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labor Party and
himself a trained economist, as having told the Convention of the :$
International Ladies Garment Workers Union, meeting in Atlantic
City, that "Soviet national income was going up 10 percent a year,!,
t
double the United States 'rate." If this continues, the USSR
'2
overtake and surpass the United States in per capita income in about
.$
four more Five Year Plans.
$3
(5
Let us turn now to our second field of competition, education. . i:!
I'
Developments here are no less startling, and unfortunately no better ;I
known, than in the field of economics proper. So far as the Soviet {;
Union is concerned, I can do no better than quote from what former 2
Senator William Benton of Connecticut wrote in the New York T i w ~
Sunday magazine section on April 1, 1956, after a trip to the Soviet
:j
Union to study educational developments there :
;I$

'a

I?

What i s it that most impresses the foreign observer about
the Soviet school system? In less than forty years, starting with
a population about 50 percent illiterate, the Soviets have built
a seven-year primary schools system rivalling our own in universality, with nearly 100 percent enrollment.
Since World War 11, the Soviet secondary school system has
mushroomed amazingly. By 1960 the basic ten-year school is
to be compulsory everywhere. In spite of acute labor shortages,
all children an to be kept in school from 7 to 17. Every Russian
youngster is to be given an education-a Communist education,
of course, but comparable in its high standards of study and
learning to an English public school or a French lycee.
Further, the USSR is on the road to surpassing the US both
in the number and percentage of students enrolled in institutions
above the secondary level. Indeed, when high level extensioncorrespondence students are included, the Soviet total of 4,300,000
enrolled in 1955 is already 70 percent aver our ?,700,WO. The
Soviet Union offers as much traming to every boy and girl as hit
or her talents and abilities will absorb.
Eighty to 90 percent of all students at Soviet higher institutions have been on state scholarships, which included stipends
rising slightly from year to year. In February we learned from
the Party Congress that beginning this autumn aU education is
to be free.
This speaks for itself, and all I would add is that the stan*
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of the English public schwl and the French lycee are far above the
average of our public schools.
The results of this enomous educational program are already
beginning to show. According to Sir John Cockroft, head of Britain's
Atomic Energy Establishment at Hawell, "Britain's output of graduate engineers was about 2,800 a year, while the figure for the United
States was 23,000 and for the Soviet 53,000." (New York T k ,April
14, 1956.) I n other words, the USSR is already turning out more
than twice as many engineers as the two most advanced capitalist
countries combined. In science proper, Sir John estimated that the
Soviet output was about ten times that of the British, and that the
Russian scientists were fully as well trained as their British counterparts.
But maybe the capitalist countries are doing something to catch
up in this all important field of education? If so, there are few
enough signs of it. T h e secret of the Russian program, of course, is
to train and vastly expand the number of teachers. To this end,
teachers are treated with the greatest respect and are among the
highest paid groups in Soviet society. The best graduates are enticed
and urged into teaching: I have even head from an American doctor
who recently visited the Soviet Union that in medicine the top 3
to 5 percent of each graduating class is not permitted to practice but
is, so to speak, drafted into the medical schools. How is it with us?
How do we treat our teachers? What inducements do we offer to
young men and women to enter the teaching profession?
Alas, I a m afraid I hardly need speak of these matters to an
audience like this. Whether f a d t y or students searching out what
career to follow in life, you know all too well the answers to these
questions. I will simply quote a few brief passages from a letter I
happened to see in the San Francisco Chronicle (April 24) when I
was recently in that beautiful city. It is signed by "A Math Professor, PhD." :

...

A teacher of science in the Soviet Union is reported to
have an income in the very highest brackets, as compared with
other occupations, whereas in the Udted States a teacher of
science usually finds himself in the lowest income bracket; often
he finds it impossible to maintain his family on a minimum
living scale.
I have myself axrived at a certain eminence, with
my Ph.D. in mathematics along with ten yeare of actual engineering experience besides 12 highly successful years as a professor. . Accordingly, I have been honored by the offer, which
I have just accepted, to assume the position of chairman of the
mathematics department of a leading private university on the
West Coast. The job pays $5,500 a year. My son-in-law, who
@uated from high school a few years ago and is now a book-

...

..
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keeper, eams almost precisely the same amount. . . . Let us face
the result: an economy which cares so little about its professors
of science as to place them on a bottom rung is not entitled to
ask for a leading world position in science, and we shall not
achieve it.

It is o sad &my, but ali too easy to understand. There is no
profit to be made out of education-not directly anyway. And 4t
is p f i t that @Eks a eapitalist society. As long as we have capitalisni,
we shall uhdoubtedly treat our teachers 9s second-class citizens, rtlisl
educationally we shall fall farther and farther behind a society whi&
p~lQ'&enoe and education abme dollars.
We come finally to the question of liberty. Here the advanced
capitalist countries started with an advantage over the Soviet Union
no less enormous &an in the field of economics. And on the whole,
diq have succeeded in preserving their lead more successfully he&
&an m economics. The Soviet police state certainly has an unenviable
record of arbitrary arrests, trials, purges, shootings, labor camps, and
all the rest-you are much more familiar with this than with the
Soviet Union's record in production and education. The question
for the future really is whether these are necessary features of socialism as such or whether they result from Russia's dark past, from
the aknost unimaginable difficulties of building an industrial economy
in a bckward country against implacable outside hostility, and from
the tensions and fears of a world in which war is an ever-present
lilreat.

L

-

.?'bg~i s no-certain way of answering this question yet. I can
that a9 a con*&
socialist3 I see no reason for desp*
and *everyreason for hap.. I do not myself attribute much of the
Swkt Union's qwrd ip &e h i d of liberty to the wil doings of any
one man, inch@.
One-gum interpretations of history a&
too easy-and r d I y -explain nothing. And yet there is no doubt that
the last few years, which happen to be the years since Stalin's death,
have witnessed a d d d 1 6 change in the Soviet world, and the
pace of this change has been sharply stepped up in recent m o n h
Many of the abuses of the past we-& shar@y denounced at the February Congress of the Communist Party. Since then, we have been
told that a aav judicial code is soan to be promulgated which will
bring the USSR closer to our idea of a government of laws rather
than of men. The labor camps have mostly been c l ~ e dand
~ it has
just been announced that they will soon be abolished altogehcr.
Workers can nav leave their jobs by simply giving two weeks mtla
A friend of mine who is a profasor at Stanford University hap@
to be in MOSCOW
on his way to India in December and again in
~ a k on
h his way back. He reports that the wfiole atmaphere¶
only say
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especially the attitude toward foreigners, had undergone a startling
change for the better.
Is all this merely a temporary aberration, or is it the beginning
of a new trend toward liberalization in the socialist countries? I
myself firmly believe the latter to be the correct interpretation. And
I think the cause is clear: the forced march in the economic sphere
is drawing to a close; Soviet citizens now constitute one of the best
educated publics in the world; the achievement of atomic parity with
the United States has given them an unprecedented feeling of security; and the Soviet Union, far from being isolated, is now surrounded by friends and allies, including the most populous country
in the world. The preconditions for internal relaxation and liberalization are there. What is especially encouraging to all who love
liberty, and that certainly includes the vast majority of the world's
socialists, is that relaxation and liberalization are actually happening.
I believe that the trend is here to stay, barring another war
which I think increasingly less likely. In the long run, it will present
capitalism with the greatest challenge of all. Up to now, the defenders of capitalism have always been able to counter arguments
for socialism with the reply: "Look at the slave labor camps in
Russia!" And there's no doubt that it has been an effective a~gument.
Now, however, the camps are disappearing. Suppose all that they
symbolize also disappears? Suppose socialism shows what Marxists
have always maintained, that it is possible to have economic collectivism and freedom? Suppose the socialist world overtakes and surpasses the capitalist world not only in production and per capita
income, not only in education and science, but also in freedom and
respect for the dignity of the individual? What then?
You may think these questions fantastic now. Perhaps. But let
me make a suggestion. Let me propose that you file them away in
the back of your mind and then bring them out, say once every year,
and check the answers you are able to give on the basis of the latest
facts available to you. I have no doubt what the answers will be,
sooner or later. If I am right, it will be facts and not my arguments
that will convince you. And I am very glad to leave it to the future
to decide.

POWER E L I T E O R R U L I N G C L A S S ?
BY P A U L

M. SWEEZY

There is a sort of contrived bloodlessness about American academic social science today. Its practitioners are much better trained
than they used to be, but the consequence is not only technical competence. No less striking is the way they all fit into a few neat molds,
like the models of an automobile coming off the factory assembly
lines. They talk alike, deal in the same brand of trivialities, and
take each other enormously seriously. Above all, there is a kind of
tacit conspiracy to banish all really interesting and important issues
from the universe of c'scientific" discourse.
Against this background, C. Wright Mills, Associate Professor
of Sociology at Columbia University, stands out as a man of courage
and imagination, an iconoclast who cares little for the sacred cows
of university administrators and foundation trustees, an innovator
who wants to get along with the important business of understanding
the United States of America in the middle of the twentieth century. In White Collar: The American Middle Clacsss, he explored
the emotional and cultural wasteIands of American society. NOW, in
The Powm Elite (Oxford University Press, $%LOO),he goes a step
farther and asks who really runs the show and what makes them
tick. The result is an absorbing book that has the added fascination
which always attachq to forbidden topics.
The plan of Ma' book k as follows: He opens with a chapter
("The Higher Circles")which -gives a general sketch of the theme
of the work as a whole. There then follow nine chapters devoted
to analyzing the Higher Ck1m fnrm various angles and by various
breakdowns: Local Society, Metropolitan 400, The Celebrities, The
Very Rich, The Chief Executives, The Corporate Rich, The Warlords, The Military Ascendancy, and The Political Directorate. Finally come five chapters of interpretation aod argumentation: The
Theory of Balance, The Power Elite, The Mass Society, The Conservative Mood, and The Higher Immorality. There is no compelling
logic to the organization of the material, and rigor and elegance
are not among Mills' outstanding virtues as a writer. The result is
that the book contains not a few asides and excursions, much repetition, and considerable excess verbiage. The whole work would
have benefited from a severe editing, and its impact on the reader
would, I think, have been sharpened and intensified if it had been
cut by, say, a quarter to a third.
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Perhaps the greatest merit of The Power Elite is that it boldly
breaks the tabu which respectable intellectual society has imposed
on any serious discussion of how and by whom America is ruled.
Those of us who inhabit what may be called the radical underworld
have, of course, never been constrained by this particular tabu, but
it must be admitted that radicals have produced very little of scientific
value in recent years, and even work that does meet minimum
standards of competence has been pretty effectively smothered. In
contr* The power Elite, written by a professor at a respectable university and brought out by a properly conservative publishing house,
has already been widely reviewed in such media as Time and The
Saturday Review of Literature, and seems certain to provoke controversy among Mills' professional colleagues. For the first time in
a long while, the literate public has been exposed to a serious discussion of social power and stratification at the national-as distinct
from the local-level, and currently fashionable theories of the dispersal of power among many groups and interests have been bluntly
challenged as flimsy apologetics. This is all to the good, and we may
hope that Mills' example will be not only heeded but also emulated
by other academic authors and established publishers.+
The fact that it raises crucially important issues is by no means
the only merit of The Power Elite. Indeed, a reviewer cannot pretend even to list all the book's many excellencies: to appreciate
them, one must read and study it with the care it deserves. But I
do want to call attention to certain features which struck at least
one reader as particularly noteworthy:
( 1) There are numerous flashes of insight and happy formulations which not only enliven the narrative but, more important,
help us to understand difficult or obscure problems. It would be hard

* Let me take this occasion to express a subsidiary hope that writers like
Mills will become even bolder in challenging the tabus of respectability.
Ever since it was founded in 1949, Monthly Review has consistently sought
to analyze and clarify the problems of national power in American societynot, I hope, without throwing out some useful and interesting suggestions.
Mills makes generous reference in his notes to our analysis of "The Roots
and Prospects of McCarthyism" (MR, January 1954) but otherwise fails to
note, even in a bibliographical way, any of the numerous articles and editorials which have dealt with one or more aspects of his chosen subject. Of
course, it is possible that Mills may not be familiar with this material or
may consider it of no value. A more likely explanation of his ignoring it,
I think, is a (perhaps unconscious) fear of what might be called "guilt by
citation." At any rate this fear is certainly common enough in academic
circles nowadays, whether or not it was operative in Mills' case. Erom the
point of v i m of the 'power elite," it serves the useful purpose of helping
to isolate radicals and censor radical thought. From the point of view of
scientific discussion and advance, needless to say, its effects are wholly
negative.
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to find a juster or more damning description of our postwar intellectuals than "those who have abandoned criticism for the new
American celebration." (P. 25.) I t is more than merely salutary to
be reminded that "class consciousness is not equally characteristic
of all levels of American society: it is most apparent in the upper
class." (P. 30.) Much of the restless movement of the United States
today is illuminated by the statement: "To succeed is to leave local
society behind-although certification by it may be needed in order
to be selected for national cliques." (P. 39.) How vividly the connection between wealth and social standing comes out in this remark: "All families would seem to be rather 'old,' but not all of
them have possessed wealth for at least two but preferably three
or four generations." (P. 49.) And how very apt and accurate is
the designation of our present-day corporate system as an "apparatus
of appropriation" (p. 107) which showers on its beneficiaries all
kinds of blessings in addition to their take-home pay. (Mills is right
to emphasize this theme in several different contexts: my only criticism is that he doesn't emphasize it enough.) These are but a
few random samples, taken from the first quarter of The Power Elite,
of what I mean by "flashes of insight and happy formulations."
They are among the real pleasures and rewards of the book.
(2) Equally impressive is the factual material which Mills has
assembled and analyzed in support or illustration of his arguments.
He has made good use of the specialized work of social scientistsfor example, H. B. Hollingshead's Elmtown's Youth and Dixon Wetter's The Saga of American Society-but for the most part he relies
on original research in the current press and biographical sources. I n
this connection, he presents a number of statistical and semi-statistical
studies which are important contributions in their own right and
which should go far toward exploding some of the more popular and
persistent myths about the rich and the powerful in America today.
Chapter 5 on "The Very Rich" is essentially such a study, and there
are others of a somewhat less ambitious nature in most of the chapters which undertake to categorize and describe "the power elite."
Mills is well aware that an individual researcher, even with considerable help from friends, students, and assistants, can hardly hope
to do more than scratch the surface of the vast amount of relevant
material which exists in this country: he was, in fact, frequently
obliged to put drastic limits on the scope of his efforts. Nevertheless,
his factual statements are for the most part solidly, if not exhaustivelv,
supported; and in a field which is not likely to benefit from the
generosity (or curiosity) of the well-heeled foundations, we shall
probably have to remain content with the contributions of individual researchers. One could only wish that they were all as careful,
competent, and imaginative as Mills.
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(3) It seems to me that Milk speaks with the voice of an
authentic American radicalism. He is highly critical of tho American
system and frequently lays about him with strong adjectives, heavy
sarcasm, and biting invective. But he doesn't hate "the M c a n
way of life" and t& his back on it, as so many of our foreign critics
do; and he h ' t overawed by foreign authority, as so many of our
native radials have always been. One gets the impression that Mills
not only undemtands but to a considerable extent men shams the
p r e d a ~ n f tvalues of the American "mass society." He indulges
in
of the currently farhionable deprecation of ''materialism,"
and his attitude toward wealth is well indicated in a pauage which
is worth quoting at some length:

The idea that the millionaire finds nothing but a sad,
empty place at the top of society; the idea that the rich do not
know what to do with their money; the idea that the successful
become fined up with futility, and that those born successful are
poor and little as well as rich-the idea, in short, of the disconsolateness of the rich-is, in the main, merely a way by
which those who are not rich reconcile themselves to the fact.
Weal* in America is directly gratifying and dtectly leads to
many further gratificatior~~.
To be truly rich is to posse%;sthe means of redking in bii
ways me's little whims and fantasies and sicknesses. "Wealth
has great privileges," Balzac once remarked, "and the most
enhkde of them all is the power of carrying out thoughts and
feelings to the uttermost; of quickening sensiiility by fulfilling
its myriad caprices." The rich, like other men, are perhaps more
simply h~manthan otherwise. But their toys are bigger; they
have more of them; they have more of them all at once.

(4.163-1M.)

The same idea is more simply summed up in a statement quoted
from Sophie Tucker (without either approval ot disapproval in the
context)-: "I've been rich and I've been poor, and believe me, rich
is best." (P. 346.) For a radical, the corollary of this attitude is that
it is not wealth that is wrong with America but poverty, and that
what is reprehensible about the rich is not that they enjoy the good
things of life but that they use their pown to maintain a system
which needlessly denies the same advantages to others. Wls, to be
sure, doesn't spell this out, but I think it is undeniably implicit in
his whole position.
It is easy to criticize this point of view, and indeed much of
h a t Mills &self says about the irresponsibility, mindlessness, anand
immorality of "the power elite'' would furnish the basis of a damn@
indictment of wealth in a context of exploitation, an indictmezit
which Mills conspicuously fails to elaborate in any thorough or sp

P O W E R E L I T E O R RULING CLASS?

tematic way. But I think that Mills' weaknesses in this connection
are characteristically American and that for this reason they have
much to teach us about the possibility and requirements of an effective American radical propaganda. Denunciations of wealth as
such, in the earlier tradition of radical thought, are likely to fall
on deaf ears in this country today: rightly or wrongly, most Americans approve of it and want more for themselves. A successful radical
movement must convince them that it really has more of it to offer
the great majority of them than has the present system of waste
and plunder.
(4) Mills perfoms a very valuable service in insisting, emphatically and at times even dogmatically, that what happens in the
United States today depends crucially on the will and decision of a
relatively very small group which is essentially self-perpetuating and
responsible to no one but its own membership. And in upholding
this position, he earns our gratitude by a forthright attack on the
social harmonics of our latter-day Bastiats such as J. K. Galbraith
and David Riesman. Galbraith and Riesman are able social scientists
and keen observers of the American scene, but their overall "theories,"
for which they have received so much praise and fame, are childishly
pretentious and superficial. It is high time that a reputable member
of the academic community should say so. Some day American social
scientists will acknowledge the debt they owe to Mills for having
been the first among them to proclaim in no uncertain terms that
the king is naked.
I do not mean to imply by this any blanket endorsement of
Mills' theoretical contributiohs. As I hope to show immediately, Mills'
theory is open to serious criticism. But he has the very great merit
of bringing the real issues into the open and discussing them in a
way that any one can understand; and he refuses to condone the
kind of slick cover-up job that so many of his academic colleagues
have been helping to put over on the American and foreign publics
in the years of the ''American celebration."

It is not easy to criticize The Power Elite from a theoretical standpoint for the simple reason that the author often states or implies
more than one theory on a given topic or range of topics. Sometimes, I think, this arises from haste in composition and a certain
intellectual sloppiness or impatience which seems to characterize
much of Mills' work. Sometimes it seems to result from acceptance
of the substancd as well as the terminology of a kind of "elitist"
doctrine which is basically antithetical to the general trend of his
thought. And sometimes, no doubt, it arises from the fact that
Mills, like most of the rest of us, has not made up his mind about
all the problems of American social structure and finds himself with
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conflicting ideas rattling around in his head. In the brief space
available here, I cannot attempt to untangle these confusions and
- contradictions, nor can I presume to say which of various possible
interpretations most accurately reflects - Mills' true meaning. Rather,
I shall concentrate on trying to show what's wrong with certain
ideas, adding in advance an invitation to Mills to correct me to the
extent that -I am wrong in attributing them to him or to make any
other rejoi,nder he may think called for.
Mills starts off with a concept of the power elite which is disarmingly simple. Those who occupy the "command posts" of our
major-- economic, military, and political institutions constitute the
power elite-the big shareholders and executives of the corporate
system, the generals and admirals of the Pentagon, and the elected
and appointed officials who occupy political positions of national significance. But this of course tells us nothing about the men who
stand at these posts-how they got there, their attitudes and values,
their relations with each other and with the rest of society, and
so on-nor does it provide any but an admittedly misleading clue
to these questions: Mills himself repeatedly rejects the notion that
the power elite in his sense constitutes some sort of natural aristocracy
of ability and intelligence, in spite of the common connotation of
the term "elite."
Having in effect defined the power elite as composed of the big
shots of industry and government, Mills' next task is to devise a
theoretical scheme within which to locate them and to guide his
empirical investigations into their characteristics and habits. Two
general approaches readily suggest themselves, and Mills follows them
both without ever clearly distinguishing them, without asking how
fir and in what respects they may be in conflict, and without any
systematic attempt to reconcile their divergent results. The first approach is via social class: the hypothesis can be put forward and
tested that those who occupy the command posts do so as representatives or agents of a national ruling class which trains them,
shapes their thought patterns, and selects them for their positions
of high responsibility. The second approach is via what Mills variously calls the "major institutional orders" (e-g., op p. 269), the
"major hierarchies" (p. 287), the "big three domains'' (p. 288),
and other more or less synonymous terms. This assumes that there
are distinct spheres of social life-the economic, the military, and
the political-each with its own institutional structure, that each of
these spheres throws up its own leading cadres, and that the top
men of all three come together to form the power elite.
Now there may be societies, past or present, in which this idea
of more or less autonomous orders, hierarchies, or domains has enough
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relevance to make it a fruitful approach to problems of social structure and power. But it seems perfectly clear to me that the United
States is not and never has been such a society. Moreover, the
cumulative effect of the empirical data presented by Mills is decbively against any such interpretation of the American system. He
adduces a wealth of material on our class system, showing how the
local units of the upper class are made up of propertied families and
how these local units are welded together into a wholly self-conscious
national class. He shows how the "power elite" is overwhelmingly
(and increasingly) recruited from the upper levels of the class system,
how the same families contribute indifferently to the economic, military, and political "elites," and how the same individuals move easily
and almost imperceptibly back and forth from one to another of
these "elites." When it comes to "The Political Directorate" (Chapter lo), he demonstrates that the notion of a specifically political
elite is in reality a myth, that the crucial positions in government
and politics are increasingly held by what he calls "political outsiders," and that these outsiders are in fact members or errand boys
of the corporate rich.
This demonstration in effect reduces "the big three" to "the big
two"-the
corporate and the military domains. There is no doubt
at all about the decisive importance of the former, and Mills makes
some of his most useful and interesting contributions in discussing the
wealth, power, and other characteristics of the corporate rich.*
But the evidence for an autonomous, or even semi-autonomous, military domain of comparable importance is so weak that it can be said
to be almost nonexistent. Historically, to be sure, the military has
normally been somewhat separated from the main stream of American
life, and in this sense one could perhaps speak of a military domain.
But it has been small and completely subject to civilian control,
quite impotent in' terms of the national decision-making which is the
special function of Mills' power elite. In wartime, of course, the military has swelled enormously in size and power, but it is precisely then
that it has ceased to be a separate domain. The civilian higher circles
have moved into commanding military positions, and the top brass
has been accepted into the higher circles. What happens in such
times is that the "power elite" becomes militarized in the sense that
it has to concern itself with military problems, it requires military
skills, and it must inculcate in the underlying p~pdatiengpater respect for military virtues and personnel.

*

The three chapters entitled "The Very Rich," "The Chief Executives," and
"The Corporate Rich" are not really about different groups. They are simply
about differently constructed but widely overlapping samplings of what is
essentially a homogeneous social s t n t u m which can be aptly designated as
"the corporate rich."
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All this has nothing in common with the rise to power of a
military order headed by an elite of 6cwarlords," though it is in these
terms that Mills describes what has been happening in the United
States since the beginning of World W a r 11, and indeed must describe
it or else abandon the whole theory of a composite power elite made
up of separate "dornainal" ewes; for on his own showing the 'cpolitical
directorate" is merely an-emamition of the corporate rich. To support the theory of "The Warlords" (Chapter 8) and "The Military
Ascendancy" (Chapter 9 ) , Mills brings forth little evidence beyond
the well-known facts that the military trade has traditionally required a specialized training and code of conduct, and that the
Patagon i s an important center of power in American life. But
these facts require no such fancy interpretation and are perfectly
compatible with a more prokc theory of the locus of power in midtwentieth-century United States.
But Mills really relies much less on facts than on a sort of unstated syllogism to back up his warlord-military ascendancy theory.
The syllogism might be formulated as follows: the major outlines
of American policy, both foreign and domestic, are drawn in terms
of a 'Snilitary definition of world reality" which has been accepted
by the power elite as a whole; this military definition of reality (also
refenred to as "military metaphysics") must be the product of the
professional dlitary mind ("the warlords") ;a g o the warlords now
occupy a decisive position within the power elite ("the military ascendancy"). This may look impressive and convincing at a first
glance, but a moment's reflection will show that it explains nothing
and c~mtitutesno support whatever for Mills' theory. Professional
military people naturally think in militaty terms and have doubtless
always tried to persuade others to see things their way. Throughout
most of United States history, they have succeeded, if at all, only
in wartime. The real problem is to understand why it is that since
World War I1 the whole "power elite" has come to think increasingly in military terms and hence to accord a place of greater
honor and power to the military. Without an answer to this, alI the
facts that seem to Mills to add up to the "military ascendancy" of
the "warlords" remain quite unexplained.
Now Mills himself never faces up to this question, and the only
relevant answer I can find is that the United States now, unlike in
the past, lives in a "military neighborhood" (the phrase is used on
a number of occasions), which presumably means that the country
is under constant threat (or potential threat) of attack and military
defeat. This is more sophisticated than kaying that we live in mortal
danger of red aggression, but its explanatory value is exactly the
same: in either case the increasing militarization of American life
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is the result of external forces. The rise of the warlords, then, is
seen as the outcome of a world historical process for which the
United States has no responsibility and over which it has no control,
and not, as Mills clearly wants to prove, as the outcome of internal
forces operating in the military domain.
Thus, while Mills appears to have. little in common with the
cold-war liberals, and -in fact rather generally holds them in contempt,
his theory of the role of the military leads to very much the same
concIusions. I believe that this is no accident. "Elitist" thinking
inevitably diverts attention from problems of social structure and
process and leads to a search for external causes of social phenomena.
Simon-pure elitists like Pareto and his followers frankly adopt this
method and find what they are looking for in the alleged natural
qualities of their elites. Semi-elitists like Mills-people who think they
can adopt the terminology without any of the basic ideas of elitist
theory-tend to get bogged down in confusion from which the only
escape is to borrow the most banal ideas of their opponents.
I t is too bad that Mills gets into this kind of a mess, because,
as I indicated above, his work is strongly influenced by a straightforward class theory which, if he had stuck to it and consistently
explored its implications, would have enabled him to avoid completely the superficialities and pitfalls of elitist thinking. The uppermost class in the United States is, and long has been, made up of
the corporate rich who directly pull the economic levers. Prior
to the Great Depression and World War 11, the corporate rich left
political and military matters largely (though by no means exclusively) in the control of hired hands and trusted agents; but since
the highly dangerous economic breakdown of the 30s, the Big Boys
have increasingly taken over the key positions themselves. Their
unwillingness to solve the economic problems of capitalism through
a really massive welfare state program meant that they welcomed
the war as the salvation of their system. Since the end of World War
11, they have accepted, nay created and sold through all the media
of mass communications, a "military definition of reality" as the
ideological-political underpinning of the war-preparations economy,
which remains crucial to the whole profit-making mechanism on
which their wealth and power rests. For this purpose, they have
lavishly subsidized and encouraged the military, which in turn has
not only grown vastly in size but also has been enormously flattered
and has become the most loyal defender and promoter of the "free
enterprise" system. The picture of "warlords" exercising a "military
ascendancy" is fanciful : our warlords have no fundamental values
or purposes different from those of their corporate colleagues; many
of them perform virtually indistinguishable jobs; and the crowning
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achievement of a military career today is the board chairmanship
of a billion-dollar corporation.* At the same time, we have nothing
even approaching a unified military order or caste seeking to impose
its "military metaphysics" on the nation. The most famous of our
"warlords," President Eisenhower, is now the most peaceful of our
influential politicians; while our most strident "militarists" are
civilian Senators Symington and Jacks~nwhose closest affiliations
would seem to be with the multi-billion-dollar aircraft industry.
No, the facts simply won't fit Mills' theory of three (or two)
sectional elites coming together to form an overall power elite. What
we have in the United States is a ruling class with its roots deeply
sunk in the "apparatus of appropriation" which is the corporate
system. To understand this ruling class-its metaphysics, its purposes,
and its morals-we need to study, not certain ccdomains"of American
life, however defined, but the whole system of monopoly capitalism.
A large part of Mills' theory and most of his facts support this
view. This, indeed, is why his book, for all its weaknesses, is such
a vital and powerful document. Let us hope that in the future he
will drop all the elitist nonsense and make the contribution he is
capable of making to deepening our theory and understanding of
the American class system.+*
In conclusion, I should like to comment very briefly on four of
the many issues which would merit detailed discussion in a full-dress
review of T h e Power Elite.
( 1 ) Because he blurs the whole problem of class and class
relations, Mills fails to throw any but incidental light on the dynamics

* On this whole range of topics, see the fascinating article entitled ccThey're
Masters of Buying By the Billion" in Business W e e k for June 23, 1956.
"They" are Generals C. S. Irvine and E. W. Rawlings, in charge of procurement and supply for the Air Force. Mr. Dudley C. Sharp, civilian Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, is quoted as saying: "These two could
run any business in the world. They're absolutely the finest executives I've
ever met." Chances are, too, that they will end up running one or more
of the world's biggest businesses!
** Mills' reasons for rejecting the ruling class concept are stated in a footnote (p. 277) which deserves no more than a footnote in reply. "Ruling
class," he says, is a "badly loaded" phrase in the sense that it contains the
theory that "an economic class rules politically." What of it? The question
is whether the theory is applicable to the United States today, and if investigation shows that it is, then the only ccloading" is on the side of truth.
As I have argued above, most of Mills' factual material supports the ruling
class theory to the hilt-provided only that one doesn't insist on interpreting
the words cceconomic" and "class" in an impossibly narrow and tortured
way. For the rest, I have already said enough about Mills' alternative theory,
repeated in the footnote in question, that a "coalition" of the "higher agents"
of the ''three domains" constitutes a power elite. (There is, of course, no
loading at an in the phrase ''power elite"!)
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of the class system-how people lose high-class status, how new
members of the ruling class are co-opted, and so on. In this connection, he completely fails to understand the role of the preparatory
schools and colleges as recruiters for the ruling class, sucking upwards
the ablest elements of the lower classes and thus performing the
double function of infusing new brains into the ruling class and
weakening the potential leadership of the working class. It is this
aspect of the American educational system, involving as it does
fairly generous scholarships and other forms of assistance for the
bright poor, which is most often and least deservedly praised as
democratic.
(2) While Mills' chapter on "The Celebrities" is informative
and amusing, it is a hopeless muddle from the theoretical point of
view. The celebrities--of screen, TV, radio, stage, sport-are not an
integral part of the ruling class or the power elite, and in general
they do not compete in prestige with the rich and the powerful. On
the contrary, the rich and the powerful have every interest in building
up the celebrities, partly because it is good business and partly to
divert the attention of the underlying population from more serious
matters. This is all part of what Mills elsewhere calls, in a memorable phrase, "the grim trivialization of American life." Mills' confusion on these questions-which of course does not prevent him
from saying many true and penetrating things about them--stems in
large part from the lack of any clear or usable theory of prestige.
He treats prestige as a pure magnitude and quite misses the point
that there are different kinds as well as quantities of prestige and that
they have different bases and perform different functions in the
social structure.
(3) I pointed out above (p. 141) that Mills strongly insists,
quite rightly in my view, that major national decisions in this
country are made by a relatively small group of people at the top
of the social pyramid. But in his concern to drive this point home,
it seems to me that he goes much too far in the direction of what I
may call "historical voluntarism." On page 24 of The Power Elite,
Mills makes the following statement:

..

It is
. true that if most men and women take whatever
roles are permitted to them and enact {hem as they are expected
to by virtue of their position, this is precisely what the elite
need not do, and often do not do. They may call into question
the structure, their position within it, or the way they are to
enact that position.
If this were really true, our only hope of understanding the behavior of the top group would be through psychoanalysis: the objectively discoverable pressures and compulsions of the social order
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which operate on the rest of us would be irrelevant to these august
Olympians. But of course it is not true, and I make so bold as to
say that most of the time Mills himself knows it perfectly well. What
corporation executive can afford to order his behavior without regard
to his company's profit-and-loss statement? What American politician
today can flout the interests of the corporate rich who put him in
office? What military man can say that the Soviet Union is no
menace and the United States should set the world an example of
unilateral disarmament? To be sure, each one of these gentlemen
can behave in the indicated fashion, provided he is prepared to lose
his job and with it his power. But this is precisely the point: like
eveqmne else, the "elite9' have roles to perform, and for the most
part they are exacting ones: failure means loss of position and power.
What Mills could and should have argued in this connection is
that the roles are not,like those of a theatrical performance, completely mapped out and rigidly determined in advance. The actors
have a range of choice which is set by the nature and laws of the
social structure under which they live, and this range may even include such fateful alternatives as that which faced Harry Truman
in August of 1945, whether or not to drop a bomb that would in a
single flash snuff out the lives of a quarter of a million human
beings. "Men make their own history," Marx wrote in the Eighteenth
Bncmaire, "but they do not make it just as they please; they do not
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past."
That is the simple truth, confirmed by mountains of historical and
personal expefimce alike. Why can't social scientists as reasonable
and sensible a, C. Wright Mills take it in and hold onto it?

(4) ~ i n aa lword
~ ~about
~ a matter which has undoubtedly dis=me left-wing readen of The Power Elite. Mills, they say,
t United States today. He shows that
explodes many myths $ m ~ the
the c & t y is run by a tiny irresponsible minority, and that in crucial
respects the consequence is a drift from bad to worse. But he says
nothing at all about what can or should. be done about it.

For my part, I see no d i d ground for criticism here. We
should be grateful for such a good book, and we can draw our own
conchsions h u t what to do about the situation it reveals. We can
even go farther and commend Milk for his restraint: we know from
his association with the magaxhe Dissent that Mills c d d e r s himself
a socialist, and we can be pretty sure that under present circumstancar Ths POZVGT
Elite -with explicitly stated socialist conclusions
would nwer have been published, reviewed, and read as it has been
without thc conclusiorts.

POWER E L I T E O R R U L I N G C L A S S ?

For the rest, it is no violation of principle not to set down
everything in your mind every time you put pen to paper. What is
a violation of principle is to set down a lot of things that aren't
true or you don't believe, and on this score, so far as I am able to
judge, Mills deserves a clean bill of health.
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